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SUGGESTIONS TOUCHING MATTER AND ENERGY.
BY PAUL R. SHIPMAN.
We speak of matter and energy or force (I use
these two latter words interchangeably for the pur-
poses of this article) as if they were essentially differ-
ent, when, in fact, it should seem, they are essentially
the same, differing in mode only.
Speaking roundly, as well as figuratively, we may
call matter funded energy— energy current matter; or
matter we may distinguish, roundly, as visible energy
—energy as invisible matter. Take, for example, the
clod at your feet. It is matter, you say; yet analyse
it, pushing the analysis as far as you may, and you
get nothing but modes of energy, with a residuum
that offers nothing different. Nevertheless, these parts
together make the clod. Whither does this unques-
tioned fact point, if not to the conclusion that matter
and energy are in essence the same? Nothing but en-
ergy can be got out of matter, because matter is noth-
ing but energy more or less compounded, as energy is
nothing but matter more or less resolved. Matter,
one may say, bears the relation to energy, always
speaking roundly, that a stocking bears to the thread
of which it is knit: ravel matter, and you have energy
—knit up the ravelling, and you have matter again.
Energy is the simpler state of the common substance
—the raw material, as it were, of which matter is the
elaboration in greater or less degree.
But if matter and energy are essentially the same,
it may be asked, what becomes of the vehicle of en-
ergy? The metaphor is superseded. If energy is a
form of matter, it is its own vehicle. The notion that
matter is the vehicle of energy is possibly a good
enough working-notion for physicists, in the present
state of physics, but has as little philosophical value
as the notion that ice is a vehicle of water, or water
a vehicle of vapor. It is secondary, not to say illusive.
It relates to states of matter, without approaching its
essential form ; it sticks in the outer bark of things.
Matter might be described as fixed energy, and energy
as free matter ; but this distinction, like every other
of which the case admits, is accidental only. No en-
ergy can be absolutely free ; no matter can be abso-
lutely fixed—not even that which Professor Dewar, if
one may credit the exultanffoes of matter, is about
to lock in the cold embrace of molecular death.
If matter and energy are one, the questioner may
persist. How is it that, in a given material system, the
energy disappears, while the matter remains ? The
energy does not disappear, nor does the matter re-
main—if the definite article is used to signify the whole
of either in the system ; the energy that disappears
carries with it a corresponding part of the matter, in
the action whereof it consists, the matter, under stress
of position, no more remaining intact than musk re-
mains intact while diffusing its odor through a room,
though the nicest balance may fail to detect the slight-
est loss of weight in either. In fact, the energy and
the matter equally disappear—equally remain.
Energy is something moving— not the effect of
something moving, but the fact. The degree of en-
ergy depends on the mass of what is moving, and the
velocity with which it moves; but the energy itself
consists in the moving or resisting something that is
another name for existence—matter in its elementary
state. Matter is not moved ; it moves— is essentially
active, not passive. Motion is neither an accident
nor an attribute of matter ; it does not belong to mat-
ter, for without it matter would have no existence, and
a thing cannot, speaking accurately, possess itself or
a constituent of itself—cannot be at the same time
both possessor and possession. Indeed, the prevalent
conception of subject and attribute, in general, not
only has no objective reality, but involves this contra-
diction. Motion is an essential part of matter, as
energy is the essential mode.
What cannot resist does not exist. Matter, it is
true, exists in states wherein it is so fine and impon-
derable as not to offer sensible resistance, but it must
be convertible into states in which it does offer sensi-
ble resistance, or cease to exist. The principle holds
good everywhere and always. The unseen is real, pro-
vided it is convertible, theoretically or practically, into
the sensible ; but not otherwise. The idea that the
unseen is the only real, or pre-eminently the real, is
philosophico-romantic bosh. The divisibility of mat-
ter soon carries us indeed beyond the reach not only
of the senses, but of the subtlest instruments by which
the senses can be implemented; yet, however far it
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may go, it can never carry us beyond a point at which
the parts are reconvertible into the sensible whole
from which they were resolved. Not the absolute
unseen, but the sensible, actual or possible, is the
only real. The insensible is conceivable only in terms
of the sensible, into which, if real, it is transformable.
Cognition of the insensible supposes cognition of the
sensible, conception being possible only within the
limits of possible perception. Let this truth be firmly
grasped. The intellectual currency that is not re-
deemable in the standard coin of the realm of sense is
worthless. What cannot be translated into resistance
has no existence, no reality, no meaning, is nothing.
Whatever resists exists, and, conversely, whatever
exists resists. Resistance and existence are inter-
changeable terms ; but resistance is synonymous with
energy or force, which is the stuff of sensible matter
—
that of which sensible matter is the more or less com-
plex form. For existence, be it observed, though fun-
damentally one, is divisible superficially into ponder-
able matter, or matter so named, and imponderable
matter, or energy, whereof each is transmutable into
the other, the two mutually blending to form the sum-
total of reahty.
There is thus no escape from the inference that the
consumption of energy is the consumption of matter.
Every act, for instance, of what we call consciousness,
but which is really nothing more than a special form
of interaction or responsiveness, infallibly wastes the
matter of the brain, determinably or indeterminably,
as exhalation wastes a grain of musk, which, notwith-
standing, experiment has shown, weighs a full grain
at the end of a generation. No atom moves without
loss of substance ; for, whatever view one may take of
the relation of energy to matter, it is admitted on all
hands that they uniformly vary in mutual correspon-
dence, every change of either synchronising with a
corresponding change of the other. The vibration of
an atom, therefore, is attended by the expenditure of
both, on any hypothesis. The table on which my eyes
now open is not, in rigorous exactness, the table on
which they shut an instant ago, for, even in the twin-
kling, it has felt that hand of change, inevitable, irre-
sistible, irremovable, which, sooner or later, come what
may, will destroy its formal identity, reducing it to its
elements, and dispersing these. The distinction be-
tween reality and appearance that once cut a figure in
metaphysics resolves itself into a simple distinction be-
tween the more or less permanent and the transient,
which, though not always equally tangible, are equally
real, and in due time equally pass away. It is ever
thus; metaphysics propounds riddles, and physics
reads them. Some day, thanks to physics, only one
riddle will remain ; and thai the world, if guided by a
sound philosophy, will give up.
But, says the physicist of to-day, atoms are con-
stant, undergoing no change. No doubt atoms (by
which I mean the organised constituents of molecules)
are relatively constant, as they are relatively simple
;
but everything in ceaseless action undergoes ceaseless
waste, and, accordingly, is on the highway to dissolu-
tion, from which nothing organised is absolutely free.
The catastrophe may be remote, and, in the case of
atoms, so far as I can see, it would not be rash to ad-
mit that it may come only with the general catastrophe
of things under the sun, of which, in this event, it
would probably mark the crisis, the elements of our
system melting with fervent heat, but the atoms last
of all—that atoms, in a word, are formed in some stage
of the catastrophe which gives birth to a S3'stem, and
dissolved in the catastrophe which ends it.
All this, however, is consistent with their incessant
loss of substance throughout the stupendous interval.
An atom, to be sure, is a very small thing, and this
interval is indeed stupendous, yet we can fairly assign
such a ratio between the momentary waste of the atom
and its weight that it might endure without appreciable
loss of substance for the lifetime of a planetary system,
as well as a grain of musk endures in like manner for
the average lifetime of man. A finite ratio, if low
enough, would answer the purpose.
Besides, an atom realises, what Webster on a
memorable occasion told Hayne, Benton, & Co., that
there are "blows to take as well as blows to give,"
causing substantial gains no less than substantial
losses, and reducing the net loss of substance, it may
be, to the lowest quantity possible under the law of
the dissipation of energy; which would bring the as-
signment of a proper ratio in the case still more clearly
within the limits of theoretical possibility.
For the rest, we may easily make too much of
atoms, as members of the cosmos, I apprehend, since
the range of existence from the infinite to the infini-
tesimal leaves us no choice but to admit an infinite
range of magnitudes beyond atoms, with some of
which, and presumably with the least conceivable of
the series, nature gets in her fine work, if not, in a
broad sense, her whole work. Compared to these,
atoms are worlds. Anyhow, in the analysis of things
atoms are not the last word.
One other objection may be anticipated. If matter
is resolvable into energy, and, when pressed by anal-
ysis, yields nothing else, how can we perceive some-
thing resisting, without at the same time perceiving
the resistance as resistance ? The former is concrete
resistance, which we perceive immediately, while the
latter is abstract resistance, the product of analysis.
Agreeably to a familiar law of mind, not questioned in
our time, I believe, we perceive the whole of the ob-
ject in perception, before we perceive its parts
—
per-
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ceive it generally, first, and specially afterwards. The
resisting something that affords our primordial con-
sciousness, presenting itself as external and conse-
quently as extended, is the object thus perceived in
its wholeness or generally, before analysis has spe-
cialised it, bringing into consciousness the resistance
as such. Resistance as such is disembodied motion
;
but the mind must apprehend motion embodied be-
fore it can disembody it. And embodied motion is
energy,—living matter,—matter to whose essence mo-
tion pertains, and which, accordingly, like Milton's
angels,
"... .vital in every part,
Cannot but by annihilating die."
Force has been called the primary attribute of
body. But in what sense is this true? In a psycho-
logical sense purely, according to my judgment. It
defines a subjective appearance in terms that have no
objective validity. The force which at any given mo-
ment a body puts forth, or is fancied to put forth, is a
partial resolution of the compounded force composing
the body; for though the body and the force it puts
forth are of corresponding form and the same ultimate
nature, they are not of the same quantity or duration,
the greater mass and permanence of the former giving
rise to the distinction of subject and attribute—matter
and force. The relation of matter and force is indeed
the relation of subject and attribute in its most general
form, and, what most concerns us here, is non-essen-
tial throughout, disappearing in the fundamental unity
of things. The difference between a body and the
force it is said to exert is at bottom, therefore, purely
quantitative ; the force is an integrant part of the
body.
The plain fact is that energy, as essentially distin-
guished from matter, is a creature of the imagination,
formed by transferring to objective changes the effi-
ciency or causal nexus which that power reads into
subjective ones—unreal in both : no reality answers to
it in either. There is matter or existence or resistance,
with its changes—nothing else. This is the bare fact
;
although men, not appreciating the simplicity of na-
ture, have clothed it with the fig-leaf of energy or
force. Philosophy need not tear off this covering.
But it is bound to look beneath it. There it will find,
if it looks deep enough, not matter and energy, but
simply matter in its various modes, whereof the mode
that men use the word energy to explain is the primary
one, though no more distinguishable from the other
modes or from matter than the sea is distinguishable
from the billows it heaves or from the water that forms
it. The primary mode of a thing, like the primary
attribute, is really the equivalent of the thing ; its pri-
mary mode, as comprehending its other modes, being
the sum of all its modes, and consequently the thing
itself. The primary mode of a thing is the thing in
its elements.
In fine, matter and energy are two names for two
aspects or two states of the same thing—of that re-
sisting something to which the former of these names
is usually given, and may be given fitly enough by
synecdoche or comprehension, but for which I think a
better name is existence, or, better still, resistance, each
of which, properly considered, has the same extension
and intension as matter in its figurative sense. Matter
in this sense, it will be noted, is indistinguishable from
energy, of which matter in its common acceptation is
a mode or state, energy itself being the primary state
of the fundamental thing. In one of these states or
in certain degrees of it, the thing is so massed and
complex as to overwhelm imagination ; in certain de-
grees of the other it is so diffused and simple as not
only to elude imagination, but to dupe reason, for,
while in the former state we all agree to call the thing
matter, in the latter some of us, misled by its tran-
scendent subtilty, are weak enough to assume that it
has become nothing, naming it consequently /wOT^y/^r/a/
substance, incorporeal agent, hyperphysical being, spirit,
and the like, words that signify nothing— that keep
the pledge of meaning to our ear, and break it to our
sense.
Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his "Principles of Psy-
chology," has a chapter on " The Substance of Mind,"
wherein he undertakes to demonstrate, first, that mind
cannot be conscious of its substance, and, secondly,
that mind is conscious that its substance is immaterial,
or, what comes to the same thing, that mind is imma-
terial because it cannot be conscious that it is material
—about as sleek a bull, to my mind, as ever pastured
in the green fields of philosophy. The chapter might
put one in mind of the lawyer's famous answer to the
complaint that his client had returned a borrowed
kettle broken. "In the first place," said he, "the
kettle was cracked when my client borrowed it ; sec-
ondly, it was whole when he returned it ; and, thirdly,
he never had it." Even Mr. Spencer's conception of
the substance of mind is open to question, I think. He
holds the substance of mind to be "that which per-
sists in spite of all changes, and maintains the unity
of the aggregate in defiance of all attempts to divide
it." But "that which persists in spite of all changes"
must be either the sum of the changes or the subject
of them. If the sum of the changes, it consists of
them, and cannot persist in spite of them. If the sub-
ject of the changes, it is a whole, whereof they are the
parts, independently of which it has no existence, and
of course no persistence, in spite of them or other-
wise. The subject of the changes and the sum of the
changes are in reality one and the same. A thing apart
from its modes is nothing. As there is thus no such
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thing it cannot be the substance of mind or of anything
else, much less that which " maintains the unity of
the aggregate in defiance of all attempts to divide it."
The latter service, happily, in place of resting with
this nonentity, is discharged by the unity of the or-
ganism, whereof "the unity of the aggregate" is the
expression. The unity of the aggregate, moreover,
belongs to mind as mind, and the substance of mind,
it hardly need be said, is not mind, as the substance
of a watch is not the watch. It is not the substance
but the form of mind that gives it unity. The sub-
stance of mind, according to my view, I have already
said, is ethereal stress,^ or matter enormously subtile,
vibrating with enormous velocity, and of which we are
conscious as energy, mind being the specific form of
stress determined by the nervous system.
If this be so, the mind, though unconscious of it-
self, not only is conscious of its substance (of that
whereof its substance is a direct portion), but is not
conscious of anything else ; for visible matter we per-
ceive only through the intermediation of the invisible
matter that we call energy. The unseen is not more
or less real than the seen, yet it is only the unseen (the
unseen not the insensible) that we perceive immediately
—of which we are conscious in the strict meaning of
the word. Strictly, I am not conscious of the pen in
my hand, but only of the wave lengths that it propa-
gates to my sensorium, and which, by a train of rea-
soning, I trace back to it, synthesising them into the
symbol of it. Of these vibrations, forming the imme-
diate object of perception, I am momently"^ conscious
through the sense of resistance—the sense that, in my
opinion, comprehends all the other senses, and is in
reality the fundamental mode of consciousness, every
possible object of which, by the bye, in all its modes,
is external, the idea that a state of consciousness is or
may become an object of consciousness being a sover-
eign absurdity. But I am here anticipating a discus-
sion whereon I do not now propose to enter.
Having been betrayed into saying thus much,
though, I maybe allowed to add certain precautionary
1 Here obviously is an opening for the telepathist, who may suggest tliat
ethereal stress bears the same relation to mind as the physicists say it bears
to electricity— that, although it cannot think or conduct thought, it may con-
duct the peculiar stress set up by the thought of one mind, and capable of re-
producing it in another, no matter how distant. The suggestion, it seems to
me, 1 confess, conflicts with no known fact or principle, but rather accords
fundamentally with all the known modes of communication from mind to
mind. The difference, so far as principle is concerned, between communicat-
ing an idea through the air, by actual articulation, and through the ether, by
ideal articulation {we think in words), is not apparent. Why may not the
subtler determination, in exceptional circumstances, pass by the subtler me-
dium, as well as the coarser determination, ordinarily, by the coarser medium?
Be this as it may, the marvels of the so-called spiritual world, it is my un-
doubting faith, are solely due to what we call matter, whose properties will be
found sooner or later to account for all of them that are real.
2 In developed mind, psychologists agree, the immediate object of con-
sciousness, as a fleeting step in the process of acquired perception, excites no
a'tention, and immediately lapses out of consciousness, presenting a case un-
der the familiar law o obli'
remarks, (i) Touch, I hold, may be analysed into re-
sistance, as certainly as the remaining senses may be
analysed into touch ; resistance is the essence of all
the senses—is for that matter the essence of mind.
(2) The part commonly assigned to muscular tension
and volition in the perception of resistance seems to
me unwarranted ; they are needed to measure resist-
ance, but not to perceive it. (3) What Kant called
the vital sense, including the sense of temperature,
the sense of health, the sense of hunger and thirst, and
so on, is no more than a consciousness of the several
organic states which these names connote, and which
do not require a separate sense, any more than hunger
requires one sense, and thirst another. The same is
true of muscular movement and muscular tension,
which call for a muscular sense as little as love calls
for an erotic sense (the elder Scaliger thought it did),
or hate for a demonic one.
Consciousness in truth is its own sense, and (sub-
jectively speaking) there is no other, what are called
the senses being simply modified parts of the bodily
surface, facilitating the communication of external ob-
jects with the brain centres, but ending where con-
sciousness begins—gateways to consciousness, which,
however, may be entered without trouble over the fence,
through the fence, and under the fence, as well as by
these "portals of the soul." Things open avenues to
consciousness, or lines of least resistance, which they
ordinarily travel ; but, when greatly excited, they some-
times cut across lots, making nothing of barriers—
strong feeling is apt to revive old habits. Yet so long
as a thing gets there, and brings out from the brain
that reaction or response wherein consciousness essen-
tially consists, it matters little whether it goes by the
highway of the senses or through the fields of general
sensibility; the point is that consciousness is acces-
sible both ways, and, when accosted by an object ap-
proaching either way, is (like Hamlet adjured by his
father's ghost) "bound to hear." The refinings of
science are very well, but so is the simplicity of phi-
losophy, to which, one should never forget, they may
all be reduced ; fundamental truth is the pole-star of
the thinker, and he who would not lose himself on the
trackless sea of knowledge must habitually recur to it,
as the mariner to his compass.
In closing this article, I may venture to recall
" a remark or two of Mr. Spencer's, bearing espe-
cially on the subject of it. Our experiences of mat-
ter, he observes, are "resolvable into experiences of
force," adding, in another connexion, that "resistance
is the primary attribute of body." If hy force Mr.
Spencer means only matter in a finer mode than that
to which we ordinarily give the name, (force in the
sense in which I have sought to present it,) his posi-
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tion is merely a paradox—false in appearance, but
true in fact ; but if he means by force something im-
material, the position, I hope I may be pardoned for
saying, is not a paradox, but an absurdity. For,
granting that a thing may be the attribute of that
which is resolvable into it, nothing can be resolvable
into it without community of nature with it, such as
does not exist between the material and the immaterial.
If force is immaterial, and matter is resolvable into it,
matter not only is destructible, but is destroyed whole-
sale every instant—nay, it does not exist at all, for, in
this case, matter is immaterial. The mutual converti-
bility of all things existing is a corollary from the
principle of which the conservation of energy and the
indestructibility of matter are phases ; so that if but
an atom were immaterialised the whole world would
run out of existence through the aperture—a single
point of absolute nothing would empty the universe.
This topping contradiction of immaterial matter I
see only one way to avoid, which is a recognition of
the fact that matter and energy are interconvertible
states of the one fundamental existence. Assuredly,
if force is immaterial, neither of Mr. Spencer's re-
marks can be true. Matter, in that case, is not re-
solvable into force, as I have pointed out ; nor can
force be the attribute of matter, for a substance is
equal to the sum of all its attributes, as a whole is
equal to its parts, and a material whole cannot be
made up of immaterial parts. Assume that energy is
an immaterial effluence of matter or in harmony with
matter, and you at once sink out of sight into a bot-
tomless quicksand. Grant that it is a material agency,
and, in my conviction, you stand on solid ground, with
the key to a consistent and complete explanation of
world phenomena. And there seems to me to be no
third position. Existence is an inscrutable fact—in-
scrutable because infinite, the properties of infinite
existence requiring for their manifestation infinite time
and space, which no finite being may compass ; it is
the one mystery, if we may with propriety call that a
mystery which is the principle of explanation—that
into which we resolve things to explain them. To this
one mystery immaterialism or unresistantism adds two
other mysteries, which, however, may be reduced to
one—namely, the action of a thing where it is not, by
something else that is not. To say the least, this is
unphilosophical. It falls under Occam's razor, not to
mention the bludgeon of common sense. It is an ob-
vious form of the doctrine that in our day has become,
justly, the especial opprobrium of philosophy—dualism.
On the other hand, resistantism, by whatever name
distinguished, leaves the one mystery in its awful sin-
gleness. It is monism—monism pure and unquali-
fied—monism in the full length and breadth and depth
of the term.
THE WRONG METHOD OF HENISM.
We publish Mr. Paul R. Shipman's article, not be-
cause we agree, but because we disagree, with him.
The line of thought which he follows is exceedingly
suggestive, but we regard his methods, not less than
his results, as faulty. He aims to construct a mo-
nistic system, "monism pure and unqualified," as he
calls it ; but his philosophy is what in previous articles
we have characterised as Henism,i or a single-concept
theory, which in utter disregard of the nature of ab-
straction selects some one general term and subsumes
under it all other ideas, whether or not they belong to
its category.
A few paragraphs quoted from the "Primer of
Philosophy " will suffice to explain the nature of ab-
straction :
" The importance of understanding the process and scope of
abstraction is very great, for abstraction is the very essence and
nature of man's method of thought. .
. .
Abstraction is a very sim-
ple process, and yet some of the greatest philosophers have mis-
understood it.
.
. . The greatest difficulty for a child when he learns
to walk is, not to stumble over his own feet. Similarly, the great-
est difficulty with philosophers is, not to stumble over their own
ideas. .
. . The very existence of many problems proves how little
the nature of abstract ideas is understood. There is, for instance,
the question which has again and again been raised, whether the
soul can be explained from matter or energy. The question itself
is wrong, and proves that the questioner stumbles over his own
ideas. We might just as well ask whether matter can be ex-
plained from energy, or energy from matter. Matter and energy
are two different kinds of abstraction, and feelings, or states of
consciousness, are again another kind. We cannot explain an idea
by confounding it with other heterogeneous ideas. What should
we say, for instance, of a man who spoke of blue or green ideas,
or who attempted an explanation of mathematical problems from
the law of gravitation ? What should we say of a philosopher who
sought to determine whether ideas could be explained from the ink
in which they are written ?
" Our abstracts are stored away, as it were, in different draw-
ers and boxes. Any one who expects to solve problems that con-
found two sets of abstractions, has either stored his ideas im-
properly, or searches for them in the wrong box."
Henists are philosophers, who, in their efforts to
be monists, store away all their notions in one box, be
it the category of matter, or of energy, or of spirit, or
of whatever else, instead of distributing them in the
places where they belong.
For our present purpose it is indifferent what defi-
nition of matter we adopt. We may define it with
Kant as that which affects or can affect the senses,
or we may, with the phj'sicists, say it is that which
can be acted upon by or can exert force. It is true
that all our experiences are possible only because we
exert force and meet resistance ; reality consists of
action and reaction, it is, as the Germans so appro-
priately call it, Wirklichkeit. But for that reason we
cannot say that everything is resistance. We must
1 See ThcMonist, vol, iv. No, 2. " Monism and Henisni,"
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not forget the nature of our abstract terms. To say
" matter is resistance " is at once a mistake. We ought
to say " matter is that which resists "; for it is not the
act of resistance, but that enduring something which
resists. Professor Mach in his definition of matter,
" zu dessen Wahrnehmung «//; die Wirksamkeit der
Sinne erforderlich scheint," very guardedly adds and
itahcises nur ; for forms and motions are also perceiv-
able by the senses
;
yet neither forms nor motions are
matter, for indeed they are not perceivable by the
senses a/onc ; an element of memory and mental ob-
servation enters into the ideas of form and change of
place ; they are not products of mere sensation.
When we make the abstraction "matter," we se-
lect certain features of our experiences, and drop all
others. When speaking of the matter of which a man
is composed, we advisedly omit his feelings, his in-
telligence, his character, his plans, and purposes, and
so forth. When speaking of motion, we mean change
of place, and not mass, not matter, not spirit, nor any-
thing else ; when speaking of force, we refer to that
which can produce motion and overcome resistance.
This seems clear enough, and yet how much is
this elementary rule of thinking sinned against! There
are plenty of henistic philosophers who are satisfied
they are monists as soon as they have stored all their
ideas into the one box of their favorite generalisation.
Whenever they try to think their ideas to an end they
become entangled in contradictions, and seeing no
way out of it, they naturally turn agnostics.
Mr. Shipman's method is henistic, and we may
characterise him as a materialistic agnostic. In former
articles he propounded the theory that there is but one
reality, viz., matter, and that is unknowable and mys-
terious. To-day he presents us with a number of conun-
drums which grow out of the henistic principle of his
method. We are told that "matter and energy are in
essence the same." "Force is material," yet at the
same time " matter is immaterial." This being so, the
old refrain follows : ' ' Existence is an inscrutable fact.
"
That any one could regard "change of place " as a
material thing seems impossible, but such is the con-
sistent sequence of Mr. Shipman's materialistic he-
nism.
There are a number of minor points in Mr. Ship-
man's article ; e. g. " energy is something moving,"
while it is the actual or potential moving of some-
thing ; matter and energy are "transmutable each
into the other," which is a new law that if true would
produce changes more wonderful than Aladdin's lamp;
" energy is a form of matter, and is its own vehicle ";
which sounds like, "a blow is the fist which deals the
blow, and a blow is its own striker"; "no atom moves
without loss of substance," an observation which, for
all we know, might prove true, but where is the veri-
fication of this startling proposition? Shall we believe
that the ether profits thereby and is thus constantly in-
creasing, or is this loss of substance an absolute loss
so that in the long run the world would dwindle away ?
" What cannot be translated into resistance has no ex-
istence. " Can we translate the theorem of Pythagoras
into resistance, or the ideas of truth, beauty, and right-
eousness? And as we cannot, have they, therefore, no
existence?
It would take more space than editorial considera-
tions will permit to unravel the stocking so ingeniously
knit from the yarn of a thin philosophical abstraction.
Nevertheless, who will not find much food for thought
in Mr. Shipman's article, which deals with problems
which prove so difficult for many profound naturalists
as well as philosophers ! p. c.
THE MEANING OF FOLK-DANCE.
BY L. J. VANCE.
Folk-dancing is not an overdone subject. The
truth is, not one person in a thousand knows what
folk- dances are, what they really mean, or how they
reach artistic development.
To-day, when people think or speak of dancing,
they have in mind the social dances of the parlor, of
ball-room, or of the theatre. But these dances have
little or nothing in common with folk- dances, or with
the classic dances of the ancients.
The characteristic of folk-dancing is the faithful-
ness with which it reflects human nature. In this
respect it differs from modern social dancing, which is
highly artificial in every way. If we look at cultivated
people, we see that they take real aesthetic pleasure in
complicated steps, in involved figures, and in unusual
movement ; or, they enjoy the springs, pirouettes,
contortions, and high kickings of the ballet-dancer.
But, if we look at a savage or a peasant, we see that
they derive no great aesthetic enjoyment from these
features of the modern dance. We might almost con-
clude, at first blush, that they have no idea of dancing
whatever. And yet, when we examine folk- dances
more closely, we find in them a certain aesthetic mean-
ing and significance.
There is much to learn concerning the nature of
dancing and of the aesthetic feelings which have al-
ways accompanied the dance. As yet little has been
done ; but enough to show that dancing is of gradual
growth, and as an art is subject to a general law of
mental evolution.
^
In this paper I shall attempt to point out some of
the aesthetic elements of the dance, and we cannot be-
gin better than by looking at their appearance in the
lower animals. The feeling for form, rhythm, meas-
1 See a paper on " The Evolution of Dancing," by the writer in T/tt; Popu
lar Science Monthly^ October, 1892.
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ured sound and motion is found very low in the scale
of nature ; how low, we do not undertake to say. The
Eesthetic sense is very pronounced among the birds.
Mr. Darwin refers to the rock-thrush of Guiana, birds
of paradise, and some others that congregate during
the mating season, and then the males show off their
plumage and perform dances before the females, which,
standing by as spectators, at last choose the most at-
tractive partner. From the taste for bright colors, for
musical sounds, and for rhythmical movements we get
by sexual selection such highly evolved aesthetic pro-
ducts as the waving plumage of the bird of paradise,
the song of the mocking-bird, and the remarkable per-
formances of the spur-winged lapwing. The lapwing
display, called by the natives its " dance, " requires
three birds for its performance. When a visitor comes
to a pair, the latter advance to meet it, and place
themselves behind it ; then all three begin a quick
march and keep step to drumming notes.
If the lower animals show a marked festhetic en-
joyment of singing and dancing performances, there
is no good reason for doubting that primitive man
must have possessed these elements of aesthetic feel-
ing. He must have been endowed with a sense of
form and rhythm. He must have been pleased, as
Mr. Darwin argues, by musical sounds and combina-
tions, though chiefly in the form of human song and
rhythm alone. And he must have been moved to in-
dulge in dancing performances. The spirit that moves
men to shuffle their feet, kick up their heels, and leap
in the air, comes from different feelings,—now from
animal or exuberant emotions and vivacity of every
kind, and now from joy and triumph and rage.
The savage's love of the dance is derived from that
instinctive delight in form, rhythm, measured sound
and motion, which is faintly foreshadowed in the lower
animals. So the earliest evidences of derivative aes-
thetic feeling which we possess are those of rude songs
and dances and ornaments. The most naked savage
is exceedingly fond of dancing. People so low in cul-
ture as to have developed no musical instruments
dance with passionate enjoyment to the clapping of
hands and the beating of sticks together. I notice in
many books of travel and reports that the lowest races
of men spend half their time in dancing. Thus, we
read that the chief occupation of the Indians of south-
ern California used to be dancing, when the men were
-not engaged in procuring food.^
The part played by dancing in the drama of court-
ship in most savage communities is not important or
decisive. That is on account of the social position of
woman. She is won, not by choice, but by force and
strength. The men do most of the dancing, but they
seldom dance in their love-making. Among many of
1 United States Geological Survey Under Lieutenant Wheeler, vol. vii, p. 29.
the lowest races the only love-dances in vogue are
those performed by the women, not by the men. Such
are the dances of the Polynesians, some of the Indian
tribes, and the natives of Tahiti. The semi-civilised
peoples of Asia, and to a greater extent the peasants
of Europe, have dances of love in which the drama of
courtship is set forth—the shy advances, the meeting
of the lovers, the maiden modesty and retreat, the
proposal, the rejection, and at last the open-armed
acceptance. Such, for example, is the Csardos, the
well-known folk-dance of Hungary.
There is no question that, from the beginning, dan-
cing has been especially the expression of love and of
love-making. The love- notions possessed by folk are
pretty uniform in different parts of the world. How-
ever much they differ in details, all folk agree in mak-
ing dancing a necessary part of the drama of courtship.
The Greeks regarded Cupid, the god of love, as an
expert dancer ; and the early painters, in all their
pictures of love, figure Cupid ever smiling and look-
ing upon dancers. Burton, in his quaint chapter on
"Symptoms of Love," makes dancing the most promi-
nent symptom. 1 It is a sure sign. Dancing still is,
says he, a necessary appendix to love matters, and
"young lasses are never better pleased than when
they may meet their sweethearts and dance about a
May-pole or in a town-green under a shady elm."
The folk-dances of love-making have served to
quicken the sense of personal beauty. By the common
consent of poets, painters, and sculptors, the standard
of beauty for mankind is to be found in the form of a
lovely woman. So, when dancing falls into the hands
of women, it becomes more and more beautiful, more
and more artistic.
In different ways has dancing been the means of
developing man's aesthetic feelings. This is shown,
at first, in the use of ornaments and decorations for
the person. Clay and ochre are used for painting or
staining the body
;
perforated shells and animals'
bones for necklaces, and so on. Feathers are made
into head-dresses by the North American Indians, and
into magnificent cloaks by the Hawaiians. Flowers
are favorite objects of decoration with the South Sea
Islanders and the Polynesians. When the savages
dance they always array themselves in fantastic style;
they color their naked bodies ; they wear wampum
beads around the neck, ornaments about the knees or
ankles and the waist; they often have large and un-
wieldy coiffures ; they carry carved sticks or wands,
rattles, whistles, and weapons in their hands. The
habit of wearing painted or carved masks, and the
employment of odd, grotesque, or fantastic costumes
in the dance is found the world over.
The more elaborate the decoration and the para-
'^ Anaiotny 0/ Melancholy
,
part iii, sect. 2.
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phernalia, the more important is the dance. The
"medicine dances" of the lower races are character-
ised by a display of color, ornament, and costume.
Then, at a higher level of culture, we have the dances
with which people celebrate their religious festivals.
These are often elaborate and spectacular affairs. Such,
for example, is "The Mountain Chant" of the Navajo
Indians.' This ceremonial, lasting nine days, pre-
sents in a dance or series of dances a myth of the Na-
vajos and shows a great advance in dramatic develop-
ment. In the use of mechanical devices, in the scenic
effects, in the skilful jugglery, in the employment of
the Shaman, or priest, as stage- manager—in all these
we see the germs of the popular drama.
The mystical ceremonies of the ancient Greeks
were dances, or series of dances, setting forth the story
of some god or some person. Thus, the Eleusinian
Mystery was a spectacular miracle-play, representing
the sorrows and consolations of Demeter, "She of the
harvest-home." At the Bacchic festivals the ancient
Greeks were no better than a mob of Navajo Indians.
The dancers covered their bodies with the skins of
beasts, smeared themselves with wine-lees, put on
masks, and assumed the parts of fauns and nymphs
and satyrs. And yet, as every schoolboy knows, out
of the dances with which the people of Hellas cele-
brated their religious festivals was evolved the marvel-
lous structure of the Greek drama.
In ancient times, the connexion between dancing
and religion was very close. The medicine-men or
chiefs of the tribe are the leaders of the dance. Ac-
cording to Mr. Beckwith, "the high priest in the reli-
gious ceremonies of the Dakotas is invariably a chief,
who, through these dances, retains his influence in the
tribe." In India the priests led the dances around the
sacred altars. India's heaven was the scene of dancing,
and every temple kept its band of dancing girls. The
kings of Israel were all distinguished dancers, none
more so than David, who danced before the Ark. The
Greeks, who were the greatest dancers the world has
ever seen, brought dancing to its highest pitch. They
made dancing part and parcel of their religion. Plato,
in his "Commonwealth," advocated the establishment
of dancing-schools in the ideal state. The Romans
had dances in honor of the pastoral gods, vine-dances
and harvest-measures. "You cannot find a single
ancient mystery," says Lucian, "in which there is not
dancing."
The connexion between dancing and religion con-
tinued even in Christian times. The early Fathers had
no serious objection to dancing ; in fact, Gregory
Thaumaturgus introduced dancing into the ritual.
Later on, the Church endeavored to suppress pagan
dances, which had become coarse and immodest. On
1 Described in Fi/lh Ethnological Report, pp. 384-468.
the other hand, she fostered miracle-plays in which
moral stories and Bible stories were told to the folk,
to the unlettered public. These plays were simply
choral songs and dances, and, in some cases, mere
spectacular shows. Finally, as a survival of the autos
sacrameniales, or miracle-plays, we have the Corpus
Christi dances, which are performed to this day during
carnival season in the Seville cathedral. Every even-
ing at five o'clock the little choir-boys dance before
the Host.
Such, then, is the meaning of folk-dance
—
passing
from the region of history and religion into the region
of poetry and frivolity, and thus following a general
law of mental evolution, namely, that practices which
occupy an important place in the minds and daily do-
ings of people in a savage stage of culture,' survive
only as matters of amusement, or of aesthetic feeling
in a period of civilisation.
CONSCIOUSNESS.
BY CHARLES ALVA LANE.
Sleep said : From thine own soul I loosen thee,
And lo ! a sense thou art that sense knows not
To trace the metamorphoses of thought
Within thy spaceless spirit's mystery :
As though a God, with potent alchemy,
Were crystallising Being from the naught,
Behold the phantom-miracles enwraught
Within thy vast of living vacancy :
From dewdrop, pinioned on star-hilted ray,
The thought in mountains 'rose athwart the day ;
Then slipt to tone, as touched with alkahest
Through all the mass. It grew a flower straightway.
Or will or pain, but never came to rest.
And on through myriad modes of Being pressed.
ery :1 Dancing
:ient Mexicans did
ous affair to the savage. Among the KwakiutI In-
, the dancer who makes a mistake is killed. The
lind putting an awkward dancer out of the way.
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